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 PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE CONTEXT OF
 VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION: AN APPLICATION
 TO CANADIAN WHEAT EXPORTS
 NATHALIE LAVOIE
 The ability of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) to price discriminate in wheat exports is examined.
 The conceptual model shows that the CWB's ability to exploit cost differences in pricing depends
 on the extent of differentiation between Canadian and U.S. wheat. This model is implemented using
 monthly confidential price data for exports to four markets from 1982 to 1994. The empirical results
 support the conclusions that (1) the CWB has market power emerging from product differentiation,
 (2) the CWB price discriminates across export markets, and (3) Alchian-Allen effects are important
 in pricing in markets valuing quality such as Japan and the United Kingdom.
 Key words: Canadian Wheat Board, marketing board, price discrimination, quality, state-trading
 enterprise, trade, product differentiation, wheat.
 In microeconomics textbooks the wheat in-
 dustry is often used to illustrate an industry
 characterized by perfect competition, and thus
 product homogeneity. This study challenges
 this view by investigating the presence of price
 discrimination in a differentiated-product
 wheat industry. Different wheat "classes" are
 used in flour destined for the production of
 raised breads, flat breads, noodles, cookies
 and cakes, pasta, etc. Not only do wheat
 classes differentiate wheat, but within those
 classes, wheat is also differentiated by qual-
 ity. As emphasized in the studies conducted by
 Mercier, and Stephens and Rowan, Canadian
 and Australian wheat are often considered by
 importers to be of better quality than U.S.
 wheat.
 With product differentiation, the potential
 exists for a large seller to exercise market
 power through price discrimination. Interest-
 ingly, both Canada and Australia export wheat
 through a single-desk seller, also known as a
 state-trading enterprise (STE).
 STEs are controversial institutions that have
 b en challenged internationally and domesti-
 cally. Internationally, the criticisms focus on
the ability of STEs to engage in unfair trade
 practices and distort worldwide trade (GAO).
 In fact, under the current World Trade Or-
 ganization (WTO) negotiation, the United
 States hopes to end the exclusive export rights
 and government financial backing of STEs
 (Miner). Domestically, STEs' benefit to wheat
 producers has been questioned in both Canada
 and Australia (Barraclough and Jones, Carter
 and Wilson).
 In the context of those challenges, prior
 research has sought to examine the bene-
 fits and costs of the Canadian Wheat Board
 (CWB) (Kraft, Furtan, and Tyrchniewicz
 (KFT); Carter and Loyns) and of the Aus-
 trialian Wheat Board (AWB) (Piggott; Ryan;
 Booz, Allen, and Hamilton). KFT and Ryan
 have examined whether the CWB and AWB,
 respectively, can market wheat at a premium
 over the price of comparable wheat from com-
 petitors. They found that the CWB and AWB
 obtained a premium in the world market due
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 to their ability to price discriminate. How-
 ever, it is unclear to what extent the measured
 price premia could also be attributed to the
 higher quality of Canadian and Australian
 wheat. Critics of the CWB have argued that
 it over-delivers on protein content and uses
 "other lucrative contract terms which utilize
 discriminatory pricing and are the equivalent
 of export subsidies" (North Dakota Wheat
 Commission [NDWC]). The over-delivery of
 protein is viewed, alternatively, as an ineffi-
 ciency (Carter, Loyns, and Berwald) or a form
 of predatory pricing (NDWC).
 The above arguments underline the im-
 portance of considering wheat heterogeneity
 when evaluating the performance of organi-
 zations such as the CWB and the AWB. The
 literature on wheat trade has addressed sep-
 arately wheat quality differentiation among
 countries and noncompetitive behavior of ex-
 porting countries.1 This study integrates the
 two literatures by examining the ability of
 the CWB to price discriminate in a manner
 that maximizes producer surplus, while treat-
 ing wheat as a vertically differentiated inter-
 mediate good.
 The literature on wheat trade is expanded
 by modeling jointly the presence of imper-
 fect competition, product differentiation, and
 a STE competing against private firms. More-
 over, the model of quality differentiation for
 consumer goods developed by Mussa and
 Rosen is modified to accommodate the real-
 ities of import demands for bread wheat, an
 intermediate input.
 Imperfect competition can be identified in
 export markets by exploiting the effect of vari-
 ables causing a price wedge between the ex-
 porters' and importers' price such as ocean
 freight rates, import duties, export subsidies,
 and exchange rates on the prices set by the
 CWB. Thus, these variables can be used as
 "instruments" of price discrimination. The
 conceptual model isolates the effect of var-
 ious instruments of price discrimination and
 demonstrates that the CWB's ability to exploit
 fluctuations in those instruments in pricing de-
 pends on the extent of the differentiation be-
 tween Canadian and U.S. wheat. The empirical
 analysis of price discrimination uses CWB con-
 fidential price data on bread wheat exports.
 Canadian and U.S. Wheat Industries
 The United States and Canada export the
 bulk of high-protein hard wheat, the type
 of wheat used in raised-bread prod ction.
 Whereas most of the Ca adian wheat produc-
 tion consists of Canada Western Red Spring
 (CWRS) wheat, a class of high-protein hard
 wheat, the United States produces a larger
 number of wheat types. Two other important
 differences between the Canadian and U.S.
 wheat industries are their marketing and va-
 riety control systems.
 A few multinational firms dominate the ex-
 porting of U.S. wheat. In contrast, all Western
 Canadian wheat going for export or for do-
 mestic processing is marketed by the CWB.
 Th  CWB markets wheat and barley on be-
 half of farmers and returns to them the sales'
 revenues, minus operating and administration
 cos s, as a pooled price. Its stated objective is to
 market "quality products and services to max-
 imize returns to western Canadian grain pro-
 ducers" (CWB 2001).
 Canadian wheat is subject to a variety con-
 trol system. Varietal standards are included
 in grade definitions and "kernel visual dis-
 tinguishability" is required. For example, the
 Neepawa variety is the standard for CWRS
 wheat. For a new CWRS variety to be reg-
 istered and marketed, it must be of equal or
 better quality than Neepawa and be visually
 different from wheat in other classes. Western
 Canadian farmers are not allowed to grow non-
 registered and indistinguishable wheat vari-
 eties for milling purposes. This system enables
 wheat to be segregated by classes reflecting dif-
 ferent end-use purposes and ensures a mini-
 mum intrinsic wheat quality.
 In contrast to Canada, the U.S. varietal de-
 velopment and release system is unregulated.
 New varieties are developed and released by
 both public and private firms. According to
 Dahl and Wilson, this difference in variety con-
 trol policy has resulted in twice as many re-
 leases of new hard red spring (HRS) wheat
 varieties in the United States as in Canada.
 American wheat producers are free to choose
 among available varieties on the seed market.
 Because different varieties within each class
 have different end-use and agronomic quality,
 such as high yield, disease resistance, etc., pro-
 ducers may not always choose varieties with
 good end-use quality. The difference in the va-
 riety control system between Canada and the
 United States contributes to the higher quality
 1 Those two literatures are reviewed in Lavoie. A review of the
 wheat differentiation literature can also be found in Stiegert and
 Blanc.
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 recognition of Canadian wheat relative to U.S.
 wheat.
 Wheat Quality
 Quality and quantity of flour produced from a
 given quantity of wheat depend on the physi-
 cal and intrinsic quality of the wheat kernels.
 Protein content is the single most important
 predictor of the end-use potential of wheat
 (Williams). For raised-bread baking, protein
 level directly impacts loaf volume and crust
 and crumb texture. Up to about 13% protein
 is beneficial for raised breads, because higher
 protein will result in complications in mix-
 ing and fermentation (Williams). Wheat with
 more than 13% protein is normally used in
 blends with wheat of lower protein content.
 Protein quality is just as important as protein
 quantity. If two flours, milled from two dif-
 ferent wheat varieties with the same protein
 content, produce two different loaf volumes,
 everything else constant, their protein is said
 to be of different quality (Tweed).
 Two surveys of bread wheat importers
 (Mercier, Stephens and Rowan) show that
 important wheat quality attributes differ by
 importing country and importer. However,
 consistency in physical and intrinsic quality, es-
 pecially the level and consistency of protein
 quantity and quality, emerges as an important
 attribute in general. Protein quantity was rated
 the most important attribute in wheat pur-
 chasing decision, followed by gluten (protein)
 quality, moisture content, and the quantity of
 nonmillable material. Canada and Australia
 have been recognized to export higher overall
 quality (physical and intrinsic) than the United
 States (Mercier). The main concern with U.S.
 bread wheat is the variability in protein qual-
 ity within and between shipments and the diffi-
 culty of the United States "to provide the level
 of protein that buyers expect" (Mercier, p. 19).
 U.S. wheat protein quality is also a concern for
 U.S. millers (Lambert and Wilson).
 Conceptual Model of Trade of a Vertically
 Differentiated Intermediate Good
 Price discrimination takes place when differ-
 ent markups exist for sales to different con-
 sumers. In an oligopoly setting, as is the case
 for international wheat trade, price discrimi-
 nation is usually explained by horizontal prod-
 uct differentiation (Katz, Borenstein 1985).2 In
 the context of this study, it is vertical product
 differentiation that enables price discrimina-
 tion. The CWB may be able to charge different
 prices in different markets because Canadian
 wheat is recognized to be of higher quality than
 U.S. wheat and willingness to pay for quality
 may vary across markets.
 Quality differentiation has not been explic-
 itly taken into account in studies examining
 price discrimination by the CWB in wheat and
 barley exports. Schmitz et al. and Brooks and
 Schmitz find evidence of price discrimination
 in feed barley exports by testing whether the
 prices between any market pair are statistically
 different. Other authors used the pricing-to-
 market (PTM) approach (Krugman, Knetter
 1989), which is based on the idea that an ex-
 porter with the ability to price discriminate
 can exploit changes in the equilibrium caused
 by movements in exchange rates whereas a
 perfectly competitive firm cannot.3 Using this
 method, Pick and Carter, Carew, and Carew
 and Florkowski find evidence supporting im-
 perfect competition of Canadian wheat ex-
 ports. Carter does not find evidence of PTM
 in Canadian barley exports. Not taking into
 account product differentiation could poten-
 tially explain findings of price discrimination
 (Sexton and Lavoie).4
 A related approach (Goldberg and Knetter
 1999) uses exchange rates to identify the
 residual demand elasticity in each destina-
 tion market. Price discrimination is indirectly
 demonstrated upon the finding of different
 elasticities in the various markets. While prod-
 uct differentiation is allowed in this approach,
 it is not modeled explicitly.
 This study develops a reduced-form test
of price discrimination, which accounts for
 a vertically differentiated intermediate good
 within a system of import demands and sup-
 ply relationships. Import demand systems for
 2 There are two types of product differentiation. Products are
 "horizontally" differentiated when they possess different charac-
 teristics, for example, a blue car versus a red car. Not all consumers
 agree on which car is preferred because they have different prefer-
 ences for color. Products are "vertically" differentiated when they
 differ by the level of characteristics, where more of a given char-
 acteristic is better. Under vertical differentiation, all consumers
 would choose the higher quality good if it was sold at the same
 price as the lower quality good. For example, a car with more fuel
 efficiency is preferred to an identical car with less fuel efficiency.
 3 Krugman coined the term "pricing-to-market," while Knetter
 (1989) developed the empirical model. Other useful references in-
 clude Marston, Knetter (1993), Knetter (1995), Gagnon and Knet-
 ter, and also Goldberg and Knetter (1997).
 4 PTM studies, such as these, typically use export unit values
 as prices-the next best alternative when confidential data can-
 not be obtained. Unit values are calculated as the ratio of value
 to volume of exports by product category and destination coun-
 try. Product categories contain differentiated products. Lavoie and
 Liu demonstrate that using unit values aggregating differentiated
 products results in false detection of PTM even when the law of
 one price holds.
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 differentiated agricultural goods have been the
 topic of recent literature (MacLaren; Davis
 and Jensen; Davis; Koo, Mao, and Sakurai).
 Import demands in most studies are derived
 from utility theory, but agricultural products,
 such as wheat, are often intermediate goods.
 Obtaining import demand systems consistent
 with profit maximization or cost minimization
 for differentiated intermediate goods is chal-
 lenging because knowledge of the production
 process is required and varies by industry. In
 this study, the vertical differentiation model of
 Mussa and Rosen is modified to accommodate
 the realities of the high-protein wheat mar-
 ket. The model generates a demand system for
 a vertically differentiated intermediate good,
 which is then used to (1) understand the role of
 quality differentiation in price discrimination
 and (2) devise a reduced-form test of price dis-
 crimination on the basis of movements in vari-
 ables causing a wedge between the export and
 import price.
 On the supply side, the specific objective of
 the CWB is modeled, as well as competition
 with U.S. sellers. Empirically, insights are used
 from the PTM approach and a reduced-form
 equation is estimated containing relationships
 present only in imperfect competition. A de-
 tailed discussion of the model can be found in
 Lavoie.
 Demand Side
 Assume that two countries (Canada and the
 United States) export a differentiated commo-
 dity-wheat-to two markets (a and b). Wheat
 is differentiated by quality only. Wheat qual-
 ity can be represented by various attributes
 such as moisture content, presence of dockage
 and foreign material, kernel size, color, protein
 quantity and quality, etc. For the purpose of
 this article, quality is modeled as consisting of a
 quality index. Thus, Canada produces wheat of
 high quality kc and the United States produces
 wheat of lower quality ku < kc. Wheat is im-
 ported for processing into an end-product, for
 example, flour. Moreover, it is assumed that an
 importing country m(m = a, b) produces wheat
 domestically of quality k7, which is lower than
 the quality of both foreign wheats. Millers, in
 each country, differ according to their desired
 end-product qualities, km. Millers in market m
 are distributed uniformly according to km E
 [sm, Km], where sm can be viewed as a mini-
 mum quality standard in market m, and Km =
 sm + 1.
 In both markets, the maximum desired end-
 product quality (Km) is higher than the quality
 of the domestic wheat (in end-product qual-
 ity equivalent terms), but lower than the qual-
 ity of foreign wheat. That is, km < Km <
 ku < kc. If the desired end-product quality of a
 miller is higher than the domestic whea  q al-
 ity (k7 < km), wheat of quali y kc or ku must
 be imported for blending in the production of
 the end-product. This situation applies well to
 bread wheats. Most importing countries pro-
 duce wheat that is not high enough in protein
 content to produce flou s us d in raised-bread
 production. As a result, domestic wheat must
 be blended with Canadian or U.S. wheat with
 higher protein content. Wilson and Preszler
 (1992), and Wilson and Preszler (1993) con-
 vey this point about the United Kingdom mar-
 ket. Japan blends both Canadian and U.S. high-
 protein hard wheat (CWRS and HRS wheat,
 respectively) with domestic and lower-protein
 U.S. wheat.
 Following Brorsen et al., the output (say
 flour) is produced using wheat and other
 inputs (labor, capital, energy, etc.) accord-
 ing to a Leontief production function. More
 specifically: y = min[x, h(S)/y], where y is the
 quantity of flour, x is the quantity of wheat,
 S is a vector of other inputs, and y is the
 ratio of other inputs to wheat inputs. While
 there is a fixed ratio between wheat and other
 inputs, h(-) may exhibit variable proportions.
 The wheat input consists of domestic and for-
 eign wheat, which are blended according to
 their respective characteristics and the desired
 characteristics of the end-product. Domestic
 and foreign wheat are blended in fixed pro-
 portion (a) based on the level of the quality
 characteristic according to x = min[qi/ar, qd],
 where qi is the quantity of imported wheat
 i(i = C, U) and qd is the quantity domestic
 wheat.5 Both the ratio of foreign to domes-
 tic wheat (or) and the ratio of other inputs
 to wheat input (y) depend on the quality of
 he domestic and foreign wheat, as well as the
 desired output quality, that is, a(ki, k7, km)
 and y (ki , km, km). To facilitate exposition,
 5 Typically, wheat is blended on the basis of more than one char-
 acteristic and millers have a range of desired end-product qual-
 ity. As such, wheat of different characteristics can be combined in
 multiple ways to achieve a given output specification. This aspect
 of flour milling is modeled in more detail in Wilson and Preszler
 (1992), and Wilson and Preszler (1993). Because this article fo-
 cuses on the quality differentiation aspect of wheat, modeling is
 greatly simplified by considering quality as a summary index of a
 product's characteristics (Bresnahan). Using a quality index is a
 reasonable assumption when consumers (millers in this case) gen-
 erally rank the differentiated products in the same order of quality.
 This ranking seems to be valid for bread wheat according to the
 surveys conducted by Mercier and by Stephens and Rowan, where
 many countries agree that Canadian wheat is of better quality than
 U.S. wheat.
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 assume that these ratios can be expressed as
 Y(.) = km/kik7 and y(.) = (km)2/kiky. The ratio x(.) reflects the essential feature that
 less foreign wheat is required as the de-
 sired quality of the end-product decreases,
 and the quality of the foreign or domestic
 wheat increases.6' 7The functional form for y (') indicates that the quantity of processing in-
 puts increases at an increasing rate as the end-
 product quality (km) increases.8 The produc-
 tion function for flour, thus, takes the following
 functional form:
 y=-min min -.q h(S), Y~m~~m~[a()~ ] j (-) p
 Assume that flour millers in market m each
 have a contract for y*m quantity of flour to be
 delivered. Moreover, each miller produces a
 different end-product quality or, said differ-
 ently, a different type of flour. The flour miller
 must choose between wheat C and wheat U
 to minimize costs subject to a technology con-
 straint. The miller therefore faces the following
 problem:
 (1) min pmsemqi + Pdd + S .t. y*m
 qiqd,S
 fo i q 1 h(S)) = mnmnL m 0, qd 0
 fori i (C, U)
 where pm$ is the landed price of wheat i in
 U.S. dollars in market m. pc is equal to pC +
 Tm + (Dm/em), where p, is the f.o.b. price of
 wheat C to market m, Tm is the ocean freight
 rate to market m (in U.S. dollars), Dm is an
 import duty in market m (in domestic cur-
 rency), and em is the exchange rate for market
 m (domestic currency per U.S. dollar). In ad-
 dition, p" is equal to pu + Tm + (Dm/em) -
 EEPm, where Pu is the f.o.b. price of wheat U,
 and EEPm is the Export Enhancement Pro-
 gram (EEP) bonus offered to market m in
 U.S. dollars.9 The variable pd is the domestic
 wheat's price and w is a vector of other in-
 puts' prices. Separate data on freight rates for
 Canada and the United States are not avail-
 able and it is assumed that Canadian and U.S.
 ocean freight rates to any given country are the
 same. This assumption is reasonable because
 bread wheat is produced in adjacent Canadian
 a d U.S. areas and exported through adjacent
 ports.
 Given their end-product quality km, millers
 in market m will use the lowest-cost wheat.
 Thus, solving the cost minimization problem
 in equation (1), the cost function obtained
 is
 (kPd mmk (km)2 Y* P +Pce kk k gm(w) kk) if buys wheat C kckd kckm
 __km_ w (km)2 " Pd + PjSekm + gm(w) kk) if buys wheat U
 Cim (.)-= kukd
 y*m P km if buys no foreign wheat Y>P+~r(W~JJ) if buys no foreign wheat
 where g'(w) is the marginal processing cost.
 Some millers may choose to purchase none
 of wheat C or U. In this case, they would use
 only domestic wheat in the production of the
 output.1?
 6 Wheat C and wheat U are considered perfect substitutes in this
 formulation even though wheat C is of greater quality than wheat
 U. Wheat C is of higher quality because it is more "productive"
 in the production of the output, i.e., a lower quantity of wheat C
 is required to achieve the desired end-product quality.
 7 The functional form of the ratio implies that wheat quality
 increases the end-product quality linearly. Such relationship exists
 between, for example, the level of wheat protein and the level
 of flour protein, test weight and flour yield, and ash content and
 flour yield (Dexter). The specific functional form was chosen for
 convenience and does not affect the qualitative effect of wheat
 quality on quantity demanded in the conceptual model.
 8 For example, as the end-product quality increases, there may
 be greater and greater requirements for labor inputs to monitor
 the various processing steps and insure that the standard is met.
 The functional form also describes a negative relationship between
 wheat quality and other inputs. Such a relationship exists between,
 for example, wheat cleanliness and cleaning inputs, protein quan-
 tity and vital gluten supplement, and wheat alpha-amylase content
 and enzyme supplement (Sarkar). The specific functional form was
 chosen for convenience and does not affect the qualitative effect
 of wheat quality on quantity demanded in the conceptual model.
 9 EEP bonuses are export subsidies allocated to specific coun-
 tries chosen by the U.S. government. U.S. exporting firms agree
 on the sales price and potential EEP bonuses with importers. U.S.
 firms then submit EEP bids to the Commodity Credit Corporation
 of the USDA. The exporter with the lowest bid receives the sub-
 sidy. Thus, importers indirectly receive the subsidy through U.S.
 exporting firms. EEP subsidies were used in U.S. wheat exports
 until 1995. Wang and Sexton provide a detailed explanation and
 analysis of the EEP bonus allocation mechanism.
 10 Allowing for a firm to use only domestic wheat is similar to hav-
 ing an "outside good" in the standard discrete choice model. The
 outside good guarantees a decrease in consumption if the price of
 both wheat C and U increases in the same proportions. The outside
 good could also be another wheat class produced domestically or
 imported. It will become apparent later that only the demand for
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 Let kmu denote the miller in market m indif-
 ferent between buying wheat C and wheat U.
 In other words,
 (m pmemku - p5$emkc)
 kCU - gm(w)(kc - ku)
 and is the value of km that solves Cm(,.)=
 CO(.)." Millers with km _ ku will buy wheat C because it is cheaper to use than wheat U.
 The demand for wheat C in market m can
 be found by adding the quantity purchased by
 millers with km _ ku and corresponds to




 (p2emku -pg'emkc))2 ( gm (w)(kc - ku) )
 where ym (m = a, b) is the sum of output
 quantity contracted by each miller in market
 m. The demand for wheat U can be obtained
 similarly by finding the miller indifferent be-
 tween buying no foreign wheat and wheat U.
 The above model is appealing in many re-
 spects. The demand equations show how the
 qualities of the domestic and foreign wheat,
 as well as the end-product quality, interact to
 determine the quantity demanded. Moreover,
 a demand system for a vertically differenti-
 ated intermediate good is generated for each
 market.
 Supply Side
 On the supply side, it is important to model the
 specific objective function of the CWB and U.S.
 firms because their wheat marketing systems
 differ. Prior research on the competitiveness
 of U.S. wheat exports does not provide strong
 evidence of the exercise of market power
 in bread wheat exports.12 For that reason
 and si plicity, profit-maximizing firms in the
 United States are assumed to engage in price
 competition. Moreover, each U.S. firm sells a
 product that is nondifferentiated from other
 U.S. firms as a result of their inability to fully in-
 ternalize the benefits from higher wheat qual-
 ity (Larue and Lapan). Therefore, as long as
 there is more than one firm selling wheat of
 quality ku, the price at which wheat U is ex-
 ported to both markets is the price Pu corre-
 sponding to the intersection of the total de-
 mand for wheat U with the residual supply.
 In other words, Da(pa,) D(, Pu) + D pb, =
 Qu(pu), where DJ (.) and Qu(Pu) are the
 demand of market m and the residual supply
 of wheat U, respectively. Solving for pu we
 obtain
 (3) pupupi)
 (3) Pu = Pu (Pa, PC).
 Wheat C is exported by the CWB-an STE.
 Because the STE sells a product that is dif-
 ferentiated from that of its competitors, it can
 charge prices that are different from competi-
 tors' prices and has the ability to price dis-
 criminate between the two markets. We seek a
Nash equilibrium in prices where the market-
 ing board is also assumed to engage in price
 competition with U.S. sellers. Following the re-
 cent literature on marketing boards and STEs
 (Thursby and Thursby; Alston, Gray, and Sum-
 ner; Alston et al.; Schmitz et al.), the CWB
 is modeled as maximizing producers' surplus
 by choosing f.o.b. prices to each market sub-
 je t to the constraint that the amount shipped
 cannot exceed the harvested quantity (Qc) of
 wheat:
 max PS = (p a - C)D"a(p$ea, pua$ea; a)
 p , ph Pc'Pc
 + (pb _ Cb)D (p eb pb$eb b)
 + (Qc - DPa (pea, paea ;a)
 - Db(p$eb, b$eb; 8b))
 The cost of marketing wheat to market m is
 denoted as Cm and corresponds to Cm = c +
 cm, where c is the cost that is not specific to
 a market (e.g., the costs of elevation, storage,
 etc.), and cm is the cost that varies by destina-
 tion (i.e., the costs of wheat transportation to
 export position in Canada); D (.) is as
 described in equation (2), 1m is a vector of
 Canadian wheat is of interest in the study of the ability of the CWB
 to price discriminate. Thus, this generalization of the model plays
 no role in the subsequent empirical analysis.
 " It is assumed that kIU < Km so that a positive quantity of
 high-quality wheat is imported in each market.
 12 For the period 1962/63-1983/84, Thursby finds evidence that is
 "at least suggestive of market power in wheat" (p. 98). Patterson
 and Abbott's results indicate that market power has only a small
 impact on the price-cost markups. Similarly, Arnade and Pick find
 some evidence of market power, but conclude that U.S. firms be-
 have in a competitive manner given the low magnitude of the mar-
 ket power coefficients. Thus, prior research suggests that market
 power is not an economically important factor in explaining U.S.
 p icing behavior in wheat exports.
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 other exogenous variables for market m (i.e.,
 Ym, Km, kc, ku, k", gm (w)), and h is the La-
 grange multiplier.13 It is assumed that wheat is
 produced once a year and there is no year-to-
 year storage.
 Note that the CWB sells on an f.o.b. basis
 whereas importers' demand is a function of
 the landed price. The variables causing a price
 wedge between the landed price and the f.o.b.
 price are key elements of the test of price dis-
 crimination developed next. Using logic simi-
 lar to the PTM model, these variables identify
 relationships that are present only in imperfect
 competition. I argue that exchange rates can
 be used as a tool to price discriminate because
 they create a wedge between the exporter's
 price and the price paid by the importer. Thus,
 other variables, such as transportation costs
 and government policy instruments (taxes, im-
 port quotas, import duties, export subsidies,
 etc.), also create a wedge between the two
 prices and can be used for price discrimination.
 I call these variables "instruments" of price
 discrimination.14
 The first-order conditions of the CWB prob-
 lem, together with equation (3), can be used to
 solve for the equilibrium price in each market
 (Lavoie). The equilibrium price of high-quality
 wheat in market m is a nonlinear expression of
 four terms, that is,
 (4) p* = f(C + k*, (kc-ku )
 STm?-- )'ku
 ( Dm kem m ,' k k
 x (p - EEPm), kc - ku )
 x (Kmgm(w))).
 For estimation purposes, equation (4) is speci-
 fied in a linear form, and the difference in price
 between two destinations, pa - pb, is taken.
 Expressing the difference in price has the ad-
 vantages of eliminating variables common to
 the two price equa ions (Borenstein 1989, and
 Arnade and Pick), which is especially conve-
 nient for empirical purposes. The resulting ex-
 pression is
 a* b I
 (5) Pc - Pc = O1 + 02(C - Cb)
 +03(kc - kkU)(Ta - Tb) 3 D D
 ku ( c -ku) )(a Db) + 0 4 k u ] \ e a e
 - O5kc (EEPa - EEPb) ku
 k( - kU)
 (Kaga(w) Kbgb(w)b x -ea eb
 here the Oi are coefficients.
 The outcome of the conceptual model is
 of interest because it shows that if the CWB
 has market power, can price discriminate, and
 markets a high-quality product, relative move-
 ments in ocean freight rates (Tm), duties (Dm),
 EEP subsidies (EEPm), exchange rates (em),
 marginal processing costs (gm(w)), and quality
 standard (Km), explain changes in the relative
 prices. However, if the state-trader does not
 have market power, with or without a differ-
 entiated product, the only factor that affects
 the difference in f.o.b. price is a difference in
 the cost of marketing wheat to these two desti-
 nations (cL - Cb). In perfect competition, the
 f.o.b. price to two markets should differ only
 by the difference in marginal cost of serving
 the two markets.
 When the state-trader has market power, an
 increase in the difference in freight rates, im-
 port duties, or processing costs between two
 markets causes an increase in the f.o.b. price
 difference between them."15 Similarly, an in-
 crease in EEP bonus in market b results in an
 increase in the price difference between mar-
 kets a and b. This confirms the general per-
 ception that the CWB had to decrease prices
 in EEP markets to make sales. To understand
 13 Because the marginal cost of marketing wheat is constant in
 this formulation, producer surplus maximization corresponds to
 net revenue maximization.
 14 These instruments are consistent with the factors the CWB
 takes into account in setting prices: "the price of competitive
 wheats offered by other exporting countries, changes in import
 levies and export subsidies used by other grain-trading countries,
 total exportable supplies of grain available in Canada, variations
 in ocean freight rates and fluctuations in foreign exchange rates"
 (CWB, 1993, pp. 465-66).
 15 The last term of equation (5) can be interpreted as a measure of
 difference in processing cost between two countries, where higher
 end-product quality raises processing costs. This term contains ele-
 ments impacting the cost savings in processing high-quality wheat
 relative to low-quality wheat. Recall that gm(w)/em is the marginal
 processing cost of wheat in market m expressed in U.S. dollars.
 Using the high-quality wheat reduces processing costs and this ef-
 fect is more important the greater are marginal processing costs,
 g"(w).
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 the effect of those variables on the price dif-
 ference, note that wheat C is purchased if it is
 cheaper than wheat U or if:
 (p2 ? Tm)em + Dm ? gm(w)km kc
 (Pu + Tm)em - EEpm gm(w)km ku
 The left-hand side represents the cost ratio of
 milling with wheat C versus U. An increase
 in ocean freight rate, import duty, processing
 cost, or a decrease in the EEP bonus will cause
 this ratio to decrease, making wheat C cheaper
 relative to wheat U. When wheat C becomes
 cheaper relative to wheat U, more millers in
 the affected market prefer wheat C, thus rais-
 ing the demand for wheat C in that market.
 This result is akin to the theorem developed
 by Alchian and Allen.16
 The importance of the Alchian-Allen effect
 is determined by the factor (kc - ku)/ku (or
 kc/ku for the EEP bonus), that is, by the ex-
 tent of product differentiation. Transportation
 costs, processing costs, duties, and EEP bonus
 are levied per unit of volume. As these per-unit
 charges increase, it enhances the desirability of
 importing the high-quality wheat because less
 is needed to produce a given finished prod-
 uct. Thus, the greater the quality difference
 between Canadian and U.S. wheat, the more
 the CWB can price discriminate.
 When kc = ku, equation (5) reduces to
 pa Pc = 02(Cc - C) - 05(EEPa - EEPb).
 In other words, when Canadian and U.S.
 wheat are identical and the CWB has market
 power, Canadian price differences adjust to
 EEP bonus differences. A price discriminating
 CWB can react strategically to a trade policy
 established by another country, such as the
 U.S. EEP subsidy, by allocating wheat to EEP-
 and non-EEP markets to maximize producer
 surplus. Thus, both wheat quality differences
 and U.S. trade policy may allow the CWB to
 price discriminate.
 In summary, equation (5) makes two points
 regarding price discrimination in quality-
 differentiated wheat exports. First, product dif-
 ferentiation enables a STE with market power
 to take advantage of a number of price dis-
 crimination instruments through an Alchian-
 Allen effect. Second, U.S. policy instruments,
 such as the EEP bonus, provide another ba-
 sis for price discrimination. Equation (5) is
 appealing because it i olates the bases for
 price discrimination and demonstrates that
 the ability of the CWB to exploit cost dif-
 ferences in pricing depends on the extent of
 the differentiation between Canadian and U.S.
 wheat.
 Empirical Model
 An empirical test of price discrimination based
 on equation (5) involves estimating the dif-
 ference in the f.o.b. price of Canadian wheat
 to two markets as a function of difference in
 the values of the instruments of price discrim-
 ination, quality differences between Canadian
 and U.S. wheat, and difference in EEP bonus.
 Statistical significance of the price discrimina-
 tion instruments indicates that the CWB has
 market power and price discriminates in wheat
 exports.
 For estimation purposes, equation (5) must
 be extended to incorporate important ele-
 ments of wheat production and trade that were
 omitted from the conceptual model. CWRS
 wheat can be purchased on the basis of grade
 and fixed protein content increments. Wheat
 of a lower grade (higher grade number) and
 higher protein content is sold at a higher price
 ceteris paribus. Thus, the variables GRADEa,
 GRADEb, PROTa, and PROTb are added to
 account for grade and protein differences of
 Canadian wheat shipped to market a versus
 b.17 Those variables enter separately (as op-
 posed to as a difference) in the model because
 importing countries may place different values
 on a grade or protein increase. The squared
 value of protein content (SQPROTm, m = a,
 b) is also included to account for nonlinearities
 in the protein price schedule.
 To estimate equation (5), empirical mea-
 sures of the conceptual variables must also be
 chosen. A variable is needed to represent the
 quality of Canadian and U.S. wheat, that is, kc
 and ku. Canadian and U.S. wheat can be dif-
 ferentiated on the basis of multiple character-
 istics. Because protein quality was listed as an
 important quality differences between Cana-
 dian and U.S. wheat in the importers' surveys
 and one of the most important factors in bread
 making, it was chosen as quality index. More
 16 The Alchian-Allen theorem states that adding the same per
 unit charge, such as transportation cost, to the price of two sub-
 stitute goods will decrease the relative price of the higher priced
 (higher quality) good, thus increasing its relative consumption.
 17 Canadian wheat sales contract specify the grade and protein
 level. Other intrinsic quality attributes such as ash and color, which
 were shown by Stiegert and Blanc to affect wheat prices are not
 included. While these attributes affect the level of wheat prices
 in any given year, prices do not vary across destination markets
 according to those factors.
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 specifically, loaf volume is used as a measure
 of protein quality. 18
 In the empirical model, LOAFm = (LOAF ~
 - LOAFS)/ LOAFJ represents the relative
 difference in loaf volume of wheat shipped by
 Canada and the United States to market m
 (m -= a, b), where LOAFS is the loaf volume of
 CWRS wheat and LOAFg is the loaf volume of
 HRS wheat shipped to market m. In equation
 (5), the relative difference in quality is assumed
 to be the same for different destination mar-
 kets. However, loaf volume varies with wheat
 grade and protein content, and these attributes
 may be different for Canadian and U.S. wheat
 exported to any given market and month. Thus,
 in the empirical specification, LOAFm is in-
 teracted with price discrimination variables by
 market. Taking transportation cost as an exam-
 ple, ((kc - ku)/ku)(Ta - Tb) in equation (5)
 becomes (LOAFa . Ta - LOAFb . Tb) in the
 empirical specification.
 The data for LOAFS are reported in the
 Canadian Grain Commission's (CGC) Quality
 of Western Canadian Wheat. It consists of the
 yearly average loaf volume of CWRS wheat at
 harvest by grade and protein content for west-
 ern and eastern Canada prairie composites.
 Yearly average of U.S. loaf volume for HRS
 wheat are collected at harvest and for export
 cargoes, and published in the U.S. Wheat As-
 sociates (USWA), Crop Quality Report. Un-
 like the Canadian data, U.S. harvest data are
 not gathered for each grade and protein con-
 tent combinations. Because loaf volume varies
 with protein content, USWA data were sup-
 plemented with protein content of HRS wheat
 shipments from grain inspection data obtained
 from the USDA Grain Inspection and Packers
 Stockyard Administration (GIPSA) to gener-
 ate a comparable data set as used for LOAFS.
 See Lavoie for more details on the computa-
 tion of LOAFS.
 The conceptual model includes CWB's mar-
 keting costs that vary by destination mar-
 kets such as storage, elevation, and inland
 transportation costs. These handling costs
 are available from a Canadian mid-prairie
 point (Sintaluta, SK) to the port of embark-
 ment for each market. DCOST represents the
 difference in handling cost to two markets.
 Manufacturing wage in each market measures
 processing costs.19 DWAGE designates the dif-
 ference in wage rate between two destina-
 tion markets. Transportation cost between the
 Ca adian export port and the import market
 port is represented by ocean freight rates. DO-
 CEAN denotes the difference in ocean freight
 rates to two markets. DDUTY represents the
 difference in import duties between destina-
 tion markets and takes a value of 0 for all mar-
 kets except the United Kingdom. The data for
 the EEP subsidy consist of the monthly aver-
 age EEP bonus for HRS wheat. The variable
 takes a value of 0 for Japan and the United
 Kingdom, which never received the subsidy.
 DEEP denotes the difference in this subsidy to
 two markets. To follow the PTM model, where
 exchange rates are instruments of price dis-
 crimination, an exchange rate index is added
 as a separate variable (DXRATE). See table 1
 for further details on the above variables, their
 units of measurements, and their source. De-
 scriptive statistics are presented in table 2.
 Description of the Price Data
 The CWB provided a confidential data set
 consisting of monthly average price and to-
 tal quantity of CWRS wheat of grade 1 and
 2 sold, as recorded in CWB contracts from
 November 1982 to July 1994. Those two grades
 are primarily used for milling and bread mak-
 ing. The data were obtained for four mar-
 kets: Japan, the United Kingdom, and two
 aggregate markets consisting of sales to all
 other countries. Rest-of-the-World west coast
 (ROW-WC) comprises all sales shipped via the
 west coast of Canada, except to Japan. Rest-
 of-the-World east coast (ROW-EC) comprises
 all sales shipped via the east coast of Canada,
 except to the United Kingdom.
 The data are disaggregated by protein con-
 tent. Wheat is sold at 0.5% increments from
 11.5% to 14.5% protein. Monthly sales are
 recorded according to the sales contract date
 for a total of 1,405 observations. All prices are
 expressed on an f.o.b. basis at the port of ex-
 port in U.S. dollars/metric ton. An observation
 consists, for example, of the January 1985 sales
 1s Loaf volume is the volume of a loaf of bread baked from wheat
 samples taken as wheat is loaded into cargoes. Similar results were
 obtained with other protein quality measures (wet gluten content
 and farinograph absorption).
 19 This variable performed better than a variable constructed as
 an interaction of a proxy for the importing countries' quality stan-
 dard (K,,) with manufacturing wages. Following Arnade and Pick,
 the proxy used for Km was real GDP per capita. This variable may
 be a poor proxy for the quality consciousness of millers and con-
 sumers, which would explain its poor performance. Manufacturing
 wage consists of an average of all industries' "manufacturing earn-
 ings" by country. Other elements of processing cost (e.g., energy
 prices) could not be included due to unavailable data.
 Table 1. Description of the Variables Used in the Estimation
 Variable Calculationa Units Definition and Source
 DPRICE p - pc Real 1990 U.S. p' is the price of Canadian wheat sold to market m = a, b (CWB)
 $/metric ton
 DCOST c - cb Real 1990 U.S. c' is the handling cost of bringing wheat from a Canadian mid-prairie point
 $/metric ton (Sintaluta, SK) to the port of embarkment of wheat for market m = a, b (CGC,
 Canadian Grain Exports)
 GRADEm No units, grade Grade of Canadian wheat sold to market m = a, b (CWB)
 = 1, 2a
 PROTm Percentage of Protein content of Canadian wheat sold to market m = a, b (CWB)b
 protein
 SQPROTm Percentage of (PROTm)2, (m = a, b)
 protein squared
 DWAGEAGEa WAGEb Thousands of real WAGEm is the real manufacturing earnings in m = a, b (United Nations,
 1990 U.S. $/month Statistical Yearbook). em is the exchange rate of market m in domestic currency
 per U.S. dollar (United Nations, Statistical Yearbook)
 DWAGEL LOAFa WAGEa - LOAFb WAGEb Thousands of real
 1990 U.S. $/month
 LOAFm (LOAFC-LCOAF) NO units LOAF) is the loaf volume (in cm3) of the grade and protein content of CWRS
 L wheat shipped to market m = a, b (CGC, Quality of Western Canadian Wheat).
 LOAFm is the loaf volume of the subclass, grade, and protein content of HRS
 wheat shipped to market m (USWA, Crop Quality Report, and GIPSA)
 DOCEAN Ta - Tb Real 1990 U.S. Tm is the ocean freight rates to market m = a, b (International Wheat Council,
 $/metric ton World Grain Statistics)
 DOCEANL LOAFa . Ta - LOAFb ? Tb Real 1990 U.S. $/metric ton
 DDUTYDa Db Real 1990 U.S. Dm is the EU import duty (Home-Grown Cereals Authority, Cereal Statistics)
 $/metric ton
 DDUTYL LOAFa 2 - LOAFb Db Real 1990 U.S.
 $/metric ton
 DEEP EEPa - EEPb Real 1990 U.S. EEPm is the monthly average U.S. Export Enhancement Program bonus for HRS
 $/metric ton wheat in market m = a, b (CWB)
 DEEPL LFa . EEPa - LFb . EEPb Real 1990 U.S. LFa = LOAF, LFb - LOAFb
 $/metric ton A
 DXRATE XRATEa - XRATEb No units XRATEm is an index of exchange rate in market m = a, b. Real 1990 domestic
 currency to U.S. dollar exchange rate measured in index form (January 1990 = 1)
 aA negative (positive) sign on GRADEa (GRADEb) reflects the effect on the price difference of a grade decrease from grade 1 to grade 2.




 Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
 United Kingdom- United Kingdom-
 Japan-United Kingdom Japan-ROW-EC Japan-ROW-WC ROW-EC ROW-WC ROW-EC-ROW-WC
 Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard
 Variable Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
 DCOST -22.23 1.53 -22.03 1.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.09 1.45 21.89 1.35
 GRADEa 1.01 0.09 1.01 0.10 1.02 0.14 1.02 0.13 1.01 0.10 1.56 0.50
 GRADEb 1.01 0.11 1.57 0.50 1.64 0.48 1.57 0.49 1.62 0.49 1.63 0.48
 PROTa 13.56 0.46 13.50 0.49 13.48 0.51 13.99 0.51 13.98 0.52 13.27 0.87
 PROTb 13.96 0.52 13.28 0.84 13.05 0.89 13.32 0.80 13.12 0.87 13.06 0.91
 SQPROTa 184.04 12.60 182.59 13.38 181.84 13.85 196.07 14.24 195.79 14.47 176.95 22.72
 SQPROTb 195.28 14.48 177.11 21.97 170.99 23.12 178.06 21.13 172.81 22.69 171.46 23.69
 DWAGE 1.04 0.37 1.98 0.47 2.37 0.49 0.87 0.22 1.19 0.21 0.29 0.14
 WAGEa 2.26 0.56 2.39 0.54 2.47 0.52 1.25 0.24 1.29 0.24 0.39 0.11
 WAGEb 1.23 0.23 0.41 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.39 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09
 DWAGEL 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.21 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.11 -3.13 x 10-3 0.04
 DOCEAN 14.68 2.31 7.53 2.50 1.28 3.83 -7.09 2.73 -13.96 3.00 -5.84 4.21
 Ta 24.79 2.97 25.25 2.82 25.46 2.74 10.18 2.23 10.38 2.34 18.34 3.32
 Tb 10.10 2.27 17.72 3.55 24.18 2.31 17.27 3.59 24.34 2.37 24.18 2.22
 DOCEANL 0.48 1.63 0.65 1.70 1.06 2.22 0.25 1.52 0.68 2.21 0.47 2.49
 DDUTY -159.01 61.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 162.06 62.26 165.03 59.03 0.00 0.00
 Da 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 162.06 62.26 165.03 59.03 0.00 0.00
 Db 159.01 61.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 DDUTYL -5.30 16.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.08 16.78 1.77 16.64 0.00 0.00
 DEEP 0.00 0.00 -19.69 18.26 -20.47 17.52 -18.35 18.87 -18.85 18.19 0.00 0.00
 EEPb 0.00 0.00 19.69 18.26 20.47 17.52 18.35 18.87 18.85 18.19 22.35 18.19
 DEEPL 0.00 0.00 -18.98 17.42 -19.51 16.64 -17.89 18.26 -18.04 17.36 0.26 3.38
 DXRATE -5.95 x 10-3 0.15 -471.14 852.69 -0.36 1.08 -431.49 809.93 -0.14 0.77 722.25 955.76
 LOAFa 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.10
 LOAFb 0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.10 -0.03 0.10 0.00 0.10 -0.02 0.10 -0.04 0.10
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 Figure 1. Price difference between Japan and ROW-WC for CWRS wheat (f.o.b. west coast)
 in relation to the EEP subsidy for HRS wheat
 price and quantity for No. 1 CWRS wheat with
 12.5% protein for exports to Japan.20
 Figure 1 plots the prices to Japan minus
 the prices to ROW-WC for CWRS wheat of
 the same grade and protein level sold dur-
 ing the same month. Most points are positive
 indicating that the prices to Japan are higher
 than prices to ROW-WC.21 The pattern of price
 differences between Japan and ROW-WC is
 related to the size of the monthly average U.S.
 EEP bonus for HRS wheat (expressed in dollar
 value on the right vertical axis of this graph).
 The export subsidy was offered to some coun-
 tries in ROW-WC, but not to Japan. In months
 where the EEP subsidy is large, as in 1988 and
 1991, the rice difference between Japan and
ROW-WC is also large, indicating a large de-
 gree f price diff rentiation. However, when
 the EEP bonuses are small, as in 1989, there is
 less price differentiat on.
 Figure 2 shows the price differences for
 CWB sales o the Unit d Kingdom relative
 to sales to ROW-EC. While some markets in
 ROW-EC have also received th  EEP subsidy,
 the price differences between the United King-
 dom and ROW-EC are smaller than those be-
 tween Japan and ROW-WC. Some data points
 show that ROW-EC prices are higher than
 U.K. prices.
 Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the ability of the
 CWB to charge different prices for the same
 wheat quality. Yet, it is also clear that these
 differences are by no means constant, may not
 be representative of the complete data set, and
 are not evidence that those prices maximize
 producer surplus. However, they do provide
 evidence that markets are segmented-a nec-
 essary condition for price discrimination. The
 empirical model will provide further insights
 regarding the ability of the CWB to price dis-
 criminate in a manner consistent with producer
 surplus maximization.
 20The observation obtained from the CWB consists of an average
 when there are more than one sale of a given grade and protein
 content to one market in a given month.
 21 Note that Japan imports wheat through an STE-the Japanese
 Food Agency (JFA). The argument that Japan maintains stable
 market shares for political reasons has been debated in the litera-
 ture (Alston, Carter, and Jarvis; Chen and Brooks; Koo, Mao, and
 Sakurai). In the context of this study, stable market shares imply
 a very inelastic Japanese demand schedule and may be one rea-
 son why the CWB can price discriminate and charge a high price
 in that market. Other researchers (Love and Murniningtyas) have
 found that Japan, through its STE, exercises monopsony power
 in wheat imports. These aspects of wheat trade with Japan do not
 affect the ability of the CWB to price discriminate in the context
 of this study (i.e., to exploit movements in the price discrimina-
 tion variables) because the market institution, namely the JFA, is
 present throughout the period of analysis.
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 Figure 2. Price difference between the United Kingdom and ROW-EC for CWRS wheat (f.o.b.
 east coast)
 Results
 The equation estimated as a test for the ability
 of the CWB to price discriminate is
 (6) DPRICE
 = 3o + 31DCOST + P32GRADEa
 + P33GRADEb + P34PROTa
 + Is35PROTb + 36SQPROTa
 + [7SQPROTb + PS38DWAGE
 + 39DWAGEL + 3loDOCEAN
 + 31iDOCEANL + P312DDUTY
 + P313DDUTYL + P314DEEP
 + 1sDEEPL + P316DXRATE
 + -17LOAFa + P3isLOAFb + e
 where E is the error term. Variable names
 starting with "D" indicate the difference in
 the value of the variable between two mar-
 kets. Names ending with "L" indicate variables
 interacted with the relative loaf volume dif-
 ference between Canadian and U.S. wheat ex-
 ports, as prescribed by the conceptual model
 in (5) and detailed in table 1. Note that the dif-
 ference in loaf volume between Canadian and
 U.S. wheat enters the equation both additively
 (i.e., LOAFa and LOAFb) and multiplicatively
 with the price discrimination instruments. This
 equation is a combination of two model speci-
 fications: (1) a specification where the relative
 difference in loaf volume between Canadian
 and U.S. wheat to two destinations was intro-
 duced multiplicatively, as specified in the con-
 ceptual model and (2) a specification where
 the relative difference in loaf volume was in-
 troduced additively. Two nonnested tests, the
 F-test and the J-test, were performed to de-
 termine the preferred specification. Results of
 both tests suggested that there is explanatory
 power to be gained by combining the two mod-
 els. In other words, a hybrid model (equation
 (6)) with loaf volume entering the model mul-
 tiplicatively and additively was preferred.
 Ordinary least squares regressions were
 run for each of six possible market pairs:
 Japan-United Kingdom, Japan-ROW-EC,
 Japan-ROW-WC, United Kingdom-ROW-
 EC, United Kingdom-ROW-WC, and ROW-
 EC-ROW-WC. The dependent variable is the
 f.o.b. price difference of CWRS wheat sold
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 during the same month to the two markets.
 In any given month, there may be more than
 one type (grade and protein content) of wheat
 sold to any given market. Thus, there may be
 more than one observation per month. For
 example, there are six observations for the
 Japan-United Kingdom market pair if three
 types of CWRS wheat are sold to Japan (e.g.,
 grade no. 1 with 13.5% and 14.5% protein,
 and no. 2 with 13.5% protein) and two wheat
 types to the United Kingdom (e.g., No. 1
 13.5% and 14.5% protein) during the month
 of interest. Monthly observations for a given
 market pair are stacked to obtain a time series
 for the estimation.
 For variables interacted with the relative
 loaf volume difference between Canadian and
 U.S. wheat exports, the variable's coefficient
 represents the effect of a unit increase in the
 difference of the quality-adjusted variable on
 the price difference between the two markets.
 For example, suppose the price difference be-
 tween Japan and ROW-EC is examined. The
 coefficient for DOCEANL represents the ef-
 fect of an increase of $1/metric ton in the
 quality-adjusted freight rate difference be-
 tween Japan and ROW-EC on the price dif-
 ference between these two markets.
 Table 3 presents the estimation results.
 The variables can be divided and exam-
 ined in three categories: those that explain
 the price difference in perfect competi-
 tion only (DCOST, GRADEa, GRADEb,
 PROTa, PROTb, SQPROTa, and SQPROTb),
 those that create an Alchian-Allen ef-
 fect (DWAGE, DWAGEL, DOCEAN, DO-
 CEANL, DDUTY, DDUTYL, DEEP, and
 DEEPL), and other variables added in the
 empirical model (DXRATE, LOAFa, and
 LOAFb). The fit of the models, as expressed
 by the adjusted R2, varies between 0.40 and
 0.50.
 The variables that would be present in
 the model under perfect competition behave
 as expected. The coefficient for GRADEm
 (m = a, b) represents the effect of decreas-
 ing the grade from grade 1 to grade 2 to
 market a on the price difference of wheat
 sold to two markets. The coefficients on
 GRADEa and GRADEb are not expected
 to be equal because different countries may
 value a grade decrease differently. Except for
 the sign on DCOST for ROW-EC-ROW-WC,
 the coefficients have the anticipated sign and
 are significant at the 10% level. The sign
 on the coefficients of SQPROTa is consis-
 tent with a concave protein schedule for the
 Japan-U.K., Japan-ROW-WC, and ROW-
 EC-ROW-WC market pairs. The signs on
 SQPROTb indicate a concave protein sched-
 ule, except for he Japan-U.K. market pai .
 Given the interaction of most other vari-
 ables with loaf volume and the nonlinearity
 of the protein variable, marginal effects (ex-
 press d in U.S. dollars) on the price difference
 are computed at the mean value of the vari-
 able using the coefficients in table 3. The re-
 sults and expected signs are rep rted in table 4
 for the variable associated with one of the mar-
 kets in the price difference. The t-statistics are
 cal ulated from each regression's variance-
 covariance matrix at the mean of the variables,
 which are assumed to be nonstochastic.
 The results in table 4 indicate that on average
 Japan, United Kingdom, ROW-EC, and ROW-
 WC are willing to pay $7.39, $5.59, $6.59, and
$9.07, respectively, for a 1% increase in protein
 level.22 The coefficients are significant at the
 10% level for most market pairs. The United
 Kingdom, which imports the highest level of
 protein, has the lowest willingness to pay for
 a 1% increase. Recall that there are optimal
 protein levels for baking and exceeding those
 levels can be detrimental.
 The variables having an Alchian-Allen ef-
 fect in general performed well. Variables that
 are significant and have the expected sign in-
 dicate that the CWB utilizes their fluctua-
 tions to price discriminate. An increase in the
 ocean freight rate to market a (Ta) has the ex-
 pected effect, to increase the price difference
 for four market pairs (Japan-United King-
 dom, Japan-ROW-EC, Japan-ROW-WC, and
 United Kingdom-ROW-EC). This effect is sta-
 tistically significant for two of those market
 pairs (Japan-United Kingdom, Japan-ROW-
 EC). The coefficient indicates that a $1/met-
 ric ton increase in the ocean freight rate to
 Japan resulted on average during the period
 of study in a $1.46/metric ton increase in the
 price difference between Japan and the United
 Kingdom, everything else held constant. The
 wage (WAGEa) variable performs well for
 Japan-United Kingdom and Japan-ROW-EC,
 but does not have the anticipated sign for the
 other market pairs. This variable represents
 th  overall country's manufacturing wage and
 may be an imprecise measure of changes in
 22 It is expected that the impact of a protein increase to one mar-
 ket has the same impact on all price differences involving that
 market. Thus, the average impact of a protein increase to Japan is
 calculated as the average of the coefficients for PROTa in the three
 ma ket pairs involving Japan.
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 Table 3. Estimation Results for the Hybrid Model
 Japan- United United
 United Japan- Japan- Kingdom- Kingdom- ROW-EC-
 Kingdom ROW-EC ROW-WC ROW-EC ROW-WC ROW-WC
 INTERCEPT -1,339.89 1,341.78* -1,114.92* 3,801.89* 561.89 81.64
 (-1.03) (3.50) (-2.16) (3.60) (0.40) (0.73)
 DCOST 3.99* 0.62 1.84* -0.36
 (5.17) (1.00) (2.12) (-1.04)
 GRADEa -21.09* -30.15* -10.86* -12.37* -13.12* -14.33"
 (-2.84) (-4.75) (-2.08) (-2.72) (-1.92) (-18.83)
 GRADEb 9.07 15.18* 6.17* 16.12* 7.98* 6.72*
 (1.58) (12.50) (4.20) (14.42) (6.01) (8.48)
 PROTa 183.56* -135.84* 226.56* -515.94* -28.46 13.88
 (2.54) (-2.54) (3.07) (-3.39) (-0.14) (1.09)
 PROTb 20.93 -54.90* -54.12* -25.84 -57.15* -24.68*
 (0.12) (-2.50) (-2.50) (-1.24) (-2.70) (-2.16)
 SQPROTa -6.38* 5.12* -8.06* 18.54* 1.24 -0.19
 (-2.43) (2.59) (-2.99) (-3.40) (0.17) (-0.38)
 SQPROTb -1.02 1.78* 1.68* 0.85 1.86* 0.62
 (-0.16) (2.13) (2.02) (1.08) (2.31) (1.43)
 DWAGE 30.15* 10.35* -7.81* -26.67* -19.88* 1.37
 (4.56) (4.16) (-2.25) (-3.48) (-3.17) (0.30)
 DWAGEL 34.31 109.42* 138.04* 121.51* -222.82* 200.61*
 (1.04) (4.16) (4.64) (2.90) (-4.40) (6.43)
 DOCEAN 1.35* 1.46* 0.18 0.56 -0.79* -0.48*
 (3.26) (4.18) (0.60) (1.43) (-2.81) (-3.92)
 DOCEANL 3.60 -8.71* -7.85* -10.40* 3.31 -10.44*
 (0.97) (-3.71) (-2.14) (-5.04) (1.18) (-9.87)
 DDUTY 0.05* 0.04* 0.10*
 (1.76) (2.43) (3.76)
 DDUTYL 0.50* -0.11 0.22
 (3.71) (-0.74) (1.27)
 DEEP -1.15* -0.92* -1.28* -1.51*
 (-2.59) (-1.90) (-3.18) (-3.56)
 DEEPL 1.03* 0.73 1.15* 1.49*
 (2.25) (1.46) (2.76) (3.33)
 DXRATE 45.05* 0.004* -10.25* -0.01" -7.22* 0.001
 (4.15) (4.03) (-5.22) (-4.04) (-4.47) (0.83)
 LOAFa -130.04 -90.04 -135.23 16.67 231.22* 98.46*
 (-1.26) (-1.06) (-1.20) (0.36) (4.18) (4.16)
 LOAFb 159.13* -84.81* -190.55* -171.00* 37.94 -271.39*
 (3.19) (-2.11) (-1.99) (-4.52) (0.51) (-9.73)
 Adjusted R2 0.45 0.50 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.42
 N 240 597 560 824 730 2,128
 Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
 *Indicate variables that are significant at the 10% level.
 wheat milling costs. These Alchian-Allen ef-
 fects appear to be more effective in markets
 that value quality, such as Japan and the United
 Kingdom, which are well known for having
 high standards.
 An increase in the import duty in the United
 Kingdom causes an increase in the price of
 Canadian wheat through an Alchian-Allen ef-
 fect as evidenced by the sign on the marginal
 effects for Da and Db. The coefficients are sta-
 tistically significant for all market pairs con-
 cerned. The impact of an increase in the duty
 on the price differe ce is small. For example,
 the marginal effect of a $1/m tric ton increase
 n the duty is an increase in the price difference
 betwe n the United Kingdom and ROW-WC
 by $0.10/metric ton on average from 1982 to
 1994.
 The impact of a $1/metric ton increase in the
 EEP subsidy to market b is positive as expected
 and varies between $0.06/metric ton for the
 UK-ROW-WC market pair and $0.21/metric
 ton for the Japan-ROW-WC market pair. An
 increase in the subsidy is only partly matched
 Table 4. Effect of an Increase of One Unit in a Variable on the Price Difference for Each Market Pair
 Expected Japan-United United Kingdom- Japan- United Kingdom- United Kingdom- ROW-EC-
 Variable Calculation Sign Kingdom ROW-EC ROW-WC ROW-EC ROW-WC ROW-WC
 DCOST P1 + 3.99* 0.62 1.84* -0.36
 (5.17) (1.00) (2.12) (-1.04)
 GRADEa 132 - -21.09* -30.15* -10.86* -12.37* -13.12* -14.33*
 (-2.84) (-4.75) (-2.08) (-2.72) (-1.92) (-18.83)
 GRADEb 13 + 9.07 15.18* 6.17* 16.12* 7.98* 6.72*
 (1.58) (12.50) (4.20) (14.42) (6.01) (8.48)
 PROTa 34 + 2136PROTMa + 10.53* 2.33 9.30* 2.98 6.18* 8.95*
 (3.00) (0.87) (2.31) (1.53) (3.03) (8.49)
 PROTb 135 + 2137PROTMb - -7.60* -7.70* -10.41* -3.13* -8.40* -8.40*
 (-4.22) (-3.94) (-4.31) (-1.69) (-4.16) (-8.81)
 WAGEa 139 + 10oLOAFMa + 31.26* 12.41* -5.64 -23.45* -24.01* -2.06
 (4.74) (5.30) (-1.64) (-2.98) (-3.78) (-0.46)
 Ta 13io + 1311LOAFMa + 1.46* 1.29* 0.06 0.28 -0.73* -0.30*
 (3.53) (3.63) (0.17) (0.75) (-2.49) (-2.52)
 Da 1312 + 313LOAFMa + 0.04* 0.10*
 (2.40) (3.94)
 Db -1312 - 13LOAFMb - -0.07*
 (-2.59)
 EEPb -14 - 315LFMb + 0.12* 0.21* 0.13* 0.06
 (2.39) (3.53) (2.87) 0.99
 DXRATE 316 - 45.05* 0.004* -10.25* -0.01" -7.22* 0.001
 (4.15) (4.03) (-5.22) (-4.04) (-4.47) (0.83)
 LOAFa 39WAGEa + 1311Ta + + 36.78 -48.73* 6.12 45.49* 15.22 -13.76
 1313Da + 317 (1.44) (-2.24) (0.20) (2.62) (0.91) (-1.36)
 LOAFb -P39WAGEb - - 1.63 4.80 -29.94 -59.44* -49.83* -39.75*
 311Tb - P313Db - (0.11) (0.24) (-1.13) (-3.25) (-2.37) (-3.91)
 1315EEPb + 1318
 Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.











 Lavoie Price Discrimination and Canadian Wheat Exports 851
 by the CWB. In fact, those results indicate that
 the CWB decreased its price less in response
 to EEP than did the European Community,
 based on results reported by Haley.
 The exchange rate (XRATE) is statistically
 significant for all market pairs, except ROW-
 EC-ROW-WC. It has the expected sign for
 three market pairs (Japan-ROW-WC, United
 Kingdom-ROW-EC, and United Kingdom-
 ROW-WC). The sign on the Japan-UK and
 Japan-ROW-EC market pairs indicate that the
 CWB adjusts prices upward to amplify the ef-
 fect of a depreciation of the yen. This effect
 makes sense in a dynamic context when future
 market shares depend on current ones and ex-
 change rate changes are expected to be tem-
 porary (Froot and Klemperer). The size of the
 estimates is small for market pairs involving
 ROW-EC. ROW-EC includes the Former So-
 viet Union, which endured large fluctuations
 in exchange rate during the period of interest.
 Finally, an increase in the relative loaf vol-
 ume difference between Canadian and U.S.
 wheat shipped to market a (LOAFa) causes
 an increase in the price difference for Japan-
 United Kingdom, Japan-ROW-WC, United
 Kingdom-ROW-EC, and United Kingdom-
 ROW-WC. The coefficient indicates that in-
 creasing the loaf volume of Canadian relative
 to U.S. wheat by one unit (essentially, doubling
 the Canadian loaf volume) results in an in-
 crease in the U.K.-ROW-EC's price difference
 of $45.46/metric ton.
 An F-test was performed to test whether
 the variables accounting for imperfect compe-
 tition significantly add predictive power to the
 model. The null hypothesis for this test is that
 the coefficients for DWAGE, DWAGEL, D-
 OCEAN, DOCEANL, DDUTY, DDUTYL,
 DEEP, DEEPL, and DXRATE are jointly
 equal to 0. According to the F-statistics, the
 model of perfect competition is rejected for
 all market pairs, indicating that the imperfect
 competition variables add significant explana-
 tory power to the model. However, not all
 of these variables add significant explanatory
 power for all market pairs. This fact makes it
 difficult to conclude that the CWB price dis-
 criminates to maximize the producer surplus
 from a given harvest.
 However, because some of the explanatory
 variables are imprecisely measured, I conclude
 that the results largely support the predictions
 of the conceptual model. Two instruments
 of price discrimination perform particularly
 well: the European Union (EU) duty (Da,
 Db) and the EEP bonus. The statistical signif-
 icance and expe ted sign of their marginal ef-
 fects across equations i dicate that the CWB
 uses fluctuations in duties and subsidies to
 price discriminate. Data quality is not as good
 for manufactur ng wages and ocean freight
 rates. Average manufacturing wages may not
 measure well millers' processing costs. Ocean
 freight rates were not available for all coun-
 tries in the two ROW markets. Thus, the
 aggregation necessary to obtain a weighted av-
 erage of freight rates for those markets may
not be perfectly accurate, as the data to the
 nearest available country were used. However,
 WAGEa and Ta perform well in terms of sign
 and sta istical significance for the Japan-UK
 market pair where the above problems are ab-
 sent and wheat quality is valued.
 In addition to data quality issues, the CWB
 may be pursuing a dynamic pricing strategy
 a d may be reluctant to adjust prices in re-
 ponse to every movement in variables such
 as ocean freight rates and import duties to
 avoid alienating customers. Thus, results that
 apparently do not support the predictions of
 the model may simply indicate that the CWB's
 pricing strategy is more complex and dynamic
 than the prescription for static optimization
 derived in this study.
 Conclusion
 Previous literature on wheat trade has ex-
 amined separately wheat differentiation and
 imperfect competition. Moreover, the trade
 and new empirical industrial organization lit-
 eratures have focused primarily on horizon-
 tally differentiated consumer goods. This study
 develops conceptual and empirical models
 to examine whether the CWB, an STE, can
 price discriminate in exports of high-protein
 wheat-a vertically differentiated intermedi-
 ate good. The conceptual model isolates the
 bases of price discrimination and demonstrates
 that the CWB's ability to exploit cost dif-
 ferences in pricing depends on the extent of
 the differentiation between Canadian and U.S.
 wheat. Confidential price data provided by the
 CWB surmount difficulties that plagued many
 prior studies of imperfect competition in wheat
 trade that have used export unit values. In fact,
 testing for price discrimination, while also ac-
 counting for the difference in wheat quality, is
 not possible using publicly available data.
 This study presents evidence residing be-
 tween the polar perspectives of prior debates
 on the performance of the CWB, such as KFT
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 versus Carter and Loyns. Specifically, inspec-
 tion of the data indicates that the CWB does
 price discriminate by charging different f.o.b.
 prices to different countries for wheat of the
 same grade and protein content. Moreover,
 the result of F-tests on the price discrimina-
 tion hypothesis supports the conclusion that
 the CWB has market power emanating from
 product differentiation and uses it to price dis-
 criminate across export markets. Finally, con-
 sistent with the conceptual model, the CWB
 is shown to take advantage of price discrimi-
 nation instruments through Alchian-Allen ef-
 fects especially for markets that value quality
 (Japan and United Kingdom). Because not all
 variables have the expected signs and some
 are not statistically significant, it is difficult to
 conclude that the CWB maximizes producer
 surplus in price discrimination. However, data
 quality is a plausible explanation for the lack
 of performance of some variables. In addition,
 results that apparently do not support the pre-
 dictions of the model may simply indicate that
 the CWB is not fully utilizing the instruments
 of price discrimination at its disposal to max-
 imize producer surplus or is pursuing a more
 complex optimization strategy than the static
 (annual) optimization problem modeled in this
 article.
 Results from this study, along with recent
 trade negotiations, illuminate the current STE
 debate and the request by the United States
 for their elimination. From 1985 to 1994, the
 United States and the EU were using targeted
 export subsidies as a tool to price discrimi-
 nate in wheat exports. Export price differences
 were not fully arbitraged because either the ex-
 ports or export subsidies from the major wheat
 exporting countries were controlled by one en-
 tity, that is, an STE or the government, respec-
 tively. In other words, the lack of competition
 within and among exporting countries enabled
 price discrimination to occur in world wheat
 exports.
 In 1994, the Uruguay round of the WTO
 negotiations required the phasing out of ex-
 port subsidies. While the United States and the
 EU lost their price discrimination tool at that
 point, Canada and Australia did not. This study
 shows that an STE with market power can use
 another exporter's export subsidy as an instru-
 ment of price discrimination. However, it is not
 the only tool if the STE markets a differenti-
 ated product from its rivals. While the elimina-
 tion of the EEP subsidy reduced the ability of
 the CWB to price discriminate, having a differ-
 entiated product enabled the CWB to rely on
 other price discrimination instruments to sell
 wheat at different prices to various importers.
 Thus, this study also provides insights into the
 U.S. concerns regarding the CWB and demon-
 strates the importance of considering quality
 differentials in the examination market power
 in wheat trade.
 [Received February 2003;
 accepted January 2005.]
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